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10-8423N

CP

1 November 1958

Brig. Gen. A. J. Goodpaster, Jr.  
Staff Secretary  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Andy:

The attached memorandum is responsive to the President's question with regard to the Cuban Navy and the supply lines of the Castro forces. I leave it to your discretion whether you feel it is worthwhile to pass it on to the President.

Faithfully yours,

Allen W. Dulles  
Director

Att:  
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10-24/12

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

SUBJECT: (1) Organization of the Cuban Navy  
(2) Sources of supply for the Cuban rebels

REFERENCE: National Security Council Briefing,  
30 October 1958

1. The small Cuban Navy does not have the capability of maintaining efficient patrols along Cuba's long coast line. It has intercepted a few rebel expeditions, largely by accident. The Navy has no major combat vessels. There are three destroyer escorts (DE's) and one motor gunboat. There are 49 other vessels--small patrol, and service craft. Most navy ships are normally stationed at Havana, but naval facilities also exist at Mariel about 20 miles west of Havana, Cienfuegos on the south coast of Las Villas Province, Santiago de Cuba, and Batabano on the southern coast of Havana Province. The navy was "purged" following the unsuccessful naval revolt at Cienfuegos in September 1957 and has played a relatively minor role in the government's operations against the rebel movement. However, naval vessels maintain

intermittent coastal patrols, and on 24 October two vessels landed troops near the US government-owned nickel installation at Nicaro on the north coast of Oriente.

2. The Fidel Castro rebel movement has no well-organized and regular supply line. Small arms and ammunition captured in battle or in quick raids on government military outposts constitute the most dependable source of supply, augmented by clandestine air shipments from abroad. Shipments by sea, important during the early months of Castro's two-year-old revolution, recently have been curtailed. Most of them

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Trucks, jeeps, and automobiles are "borrowed" from local sources, many of them US businesses or individuals. Food and clothing are supplied largely by residents of the areas under rebel control and by pro-rebel organizations throughout the island.

ALLEN W. DULLES  
Director

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